Dra. Dejanira, nossa associada,
é a nova diretora do Instituto da CNEN no Rio de Janeiro dedicado à Radioproteção ...mais
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Dra. Dejanira, nossa associada,
é a nova diretora do Instituto da CNEN no Rio de Janeiro dedicado à Radioproteção ...mais
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Radiação
Não Ionizante
The International
Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association, held every 4 years, is the largest event in the world for the RP
community  
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Notem na figura abaixo que os reatores BWR só
possuem dois circuitos de refrigeração. Um gerando vapor para as
turbinas e outro com água do mar para o condensador.
Radioprotecionistas e especialistas em Segurança
Nuclear já previam a possibilidade de inundações e acidentes como os
ocorridos nas Centrais Nucleares japonesas. Vejam normativas publicadas em
forma de Guia de Segurança pela Agência Internacional
de Energia Atômica - IAEA - http://www-pub.iaea.org/
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Vejam abaixo uma pequena síntese do ocorrido e a perspectiva mais provável. SEQÜENCIA DO DESASTRE Terremoto de magnitude 8,8 a 9 (escala logarítmica) Descobrimento e aquecimento das varetas com urânio Necessidade de alívio da pressão Cenário otimista Reconexão elétrica, embora precária
Portanto, não deverá haver mortes por radiação (mesmo
de trabalhadores da usina), nem efeitos agudos na população. "To date (1 JUNE 2011) no health effects have been reported in any person as a result of radiation exposure from the nuclear accident" " (...) the residents in the affected area are still struggling from the effects of the accident. They continue to face grave concerns, including the health effects of radiation exposure, displacement, the dissolution of families, disruption of their lives and lifestyles and the contamination of vast areas of the environment."
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Basic Safety Requirements Measures for the protection of nuclear power plant sites against floods (...) are also discussed. 2. GENERAL APPROACH TO EVALUATION OF THE FLOOD HAZARD FLOOD SCENARIOS 2.9. In this Safety Guide, recommendations are made for selecting the event with the worst effects on the site due to flooding (...) EXPECTED MAIN EFFECTS OF FLOODING ON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITES 2.12. The effects of flooding on a nuclear power plant site may have a major bearing on the safety of the plant and may lead to a postulated initiating event (PIE) that is to be included in the plant safety analysis. The presence of water in many areas of the plant may be a common cause of failure for safety related systems, such as the emergency power supply systems or the electric switchyard, with the associated possibility of losing the external connection to the electrical power grid, the decay heat removal system and other vital systems. 2.14. The dynamic effect of the water can be damaging to the structure and the foundations of the plant as well as the many systems and components located outside the plant. 2.26. A dam failure or tsunami, where applicable, may generate a flood substantially more severe than any due to natural meteorological phenomena. As the most suitable protection against flooding, the plant should be constructed at a level where it will not be affected by floods. The preliminary evaluation of the flood level is therefore extremely important and should be given due attention in selecting a site. 11. TSUNAMI FLOODING EARTHQUAKE INDUCED TSUNAMIS (...) 11.5. (...) the probable maximum tsunami generated from the worst case of either specified distant geoseismic activity or local geoseismic activity should be determined (...) (...) 13. ASPECTS OF FLOOD PROTECTION FOR COASTAL (...) SITES TYPES OF PROTECTION 13.5. A nuclear power plant may be protected from the design basis flood by the following methods: (a) All items important to safety should be constructed above the level of the design basis flood, (...). This can be accomplished, if necessary, by locating the plant at a sufficiently high elevation or (...) (b) Permanent external barriers (...) should be constructed. the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commissionhttp://naiic.go.jp/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/NAIIC_report_lo_res2.pdf (...) The construction of the Fukushima Daiichi Plant that began in 1967 was based on the seismological knowledge at that time. As research continued over the years, researchers repeatedly pointed out the high possibility of tsunami levels reaching beyond the assumptions made at the time of construction, as well as the possibility of core damage in the case of such a tsunami (...).The direct causes of the accident were all foreseeable prior to March 11, 2011. But the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was incapable of withstanding the earthquake and tsunami that hit on that day. The operator (TEPCO), the regulatory bodies (NISA and NSC) and the government body promoting the nuclear power industry (METI), all failed to correctly develop the most basic safety requirements—such as assessing the probability of damage and preparing for containing collateral damage from such a disaster (...). |
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| NOTÍCIAS | EVENTOS | |||||||||
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Conheça o grupo de discussão Radioprotecionistas: http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/radioprotecionistas/ Grupo organizado pela SBPR - Sociedade Brasileira de Proteção
Radiológica (http://www.sbpr.org.br/) e pela SPPCR - Sociedade Portuguesa
de Proteção Contra Radiações (www.sppcr.eu/) visando congregar sócios e
não sócios visando o intercâmbio de conhecimentos e informação na área de
radioproteção e temas afins. Endereços da rede radioprotecionistas:
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| Para entrar no grupo envie e-mail para: | radioprotecionistas-subscribe@yahoogrupos.com.br |
| Membros enviam mensagens para: | radioprotecionistas@yahoogrupos.com.br |
| Para sair do grupo: | radioprotecionistas-unsubscribe@yahoogrupos.com.br |
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